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## THE INDIAN PROBLEM AND IMPERIAL POLITICS.

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An address delivered at Clark University during the Conference upon the Far East.

The demand of natives of India for a greater degree of self-government, possibly for complete freedom from foreign control, has within recent years defined and enlivened the present problem of India. This problem is infinitely complex. Its roots lie deep in Indian history; and its solution is "on the knees of the gods." Here are questions peculiar to India and here also is a situation revealing forces which are at work throughout Asia. Furthermore it involves much more than the adjustment of relations between European and Asiatic, for the conditions which affect party politics in England and which influence international policies throughout the world are also entangled. Indeed, as in so many large questions of governments, racial, religious, economic, and educational ideals are fused in the passionate life of a problem of fundamental importance. Here then is a very difficult matter, not likely to be quickly settled. It will be possible therefore only to ask for some of the causes of this difficulty, to analyze the question rather than to attempt to answer it.

We must, however, recognize at the outset that recent investigations and new conditions force us to deny or to disregard certain generalizations and deductions as to Indian history. Thus the notion of an absent-minded, unintentional acquisition of India by the English, which Sir John Seeley set forth, is not based on the facts. So the assumption is mistaken that, because English rule in India has in the last analysis depended on force, it must and should depend on force, and force alone, for all time to come. Of similar stuff

is the occasional catholic self-congratulation on the undoubted but ill-defined benefits of British administration. The emphasis which many wiser writers have with justice laid on the military aspect of the revolt of 1857 has also tended to obscure the fundamental fact that British administrative policy, political as well as military, was in large degree responsible for a rising that was much more than a mutiny. Again the lack of national feeling and of efficient national organization in India, at least since the English have known India, threatens to give too long a lease of life to the statement that there can be no Indian nation. Indeed one is in the making to-day.

But by way of contrast note the equally mistaken prejudice that a brilliant and prolific antiquity, the imperial as well as the local tradition of India, should entitle the descendants of earlier rulers to a larger degree of self-government to-day, perhaps to entire freedom from foreign rule. As well argue that the Greek to-day is fit to inspire modern civilization, that the silvern memories of the Incas should secure to Peruvians the larger claim in South America or, on the other hand, that a record of centuries sunk in subjugation and disunion should to-day operate to deprive the Italian of his independence and his national pride. Frequently also we find the preposterous statement that famines were unknown in India before British administration. Too often the intended conclusion is that the British are responsible for recent famines. The slightest examination of native documents of earlier Hindu, of Muhammadan or of Maratha origin is sufficient to show the falsity of this statement. The deforestation of ancient India is a fundamental cause of drought and famine. Indeed in the Rig Veda (Book III, Hymn 8) some remote conception of this sort may be recognized, for the prayer to the "Sovran of the Forest" beseeches freedom from "poverty. and famine." The prayer to Indra (the rain-god) in Book VIII, Hymn 55, reads: "From this our misery and famine set us free;" and again in Book X, Hymn 42, is the prayer, "May we subdue all famine and evil want with store of grain and cattle." The prayers for rain are of course numerous; and so clearly

was the evil recognized that the word for plague became synonymous with famine. But it is possible that some of the hymns of the Rig Veda were written before the Hindu conquerors of India are supposed to have entered India. Even if this were so the continued use of these hymns throughout the history of Hindu India would indicate their appreciation by priest and people as well. So also we have the equivalent to our English phrase, "let well enough alone." The Indian proverb runs: "Through too great cold the wood is burned, through too much rain famine comes; too much is ever bad." Here of course the cause of famine is assumed to be an excessively wet season. Then we have the old law that in famine-time a man could take his wife's property to support life without obligation of refunding. Famine, therefore, seems to have been a familiar experience in ancient times. For the year 1396 A.D., we have the record in a Maratha manuscript of the "dreadful famine" distinguished from all others by a special name, the "Durga Diwi." The Hindu tradition declared that it lasted for twelve years and that its disastrous influence was seen in the continued depopulation nearly thirty years later of the vast region between the Godavari and the Kistna. The Muhammadan historians, not of one but widely scattered parts of India make frequent allusions to frightful famines; and Bernier the French traveler, wrote in the seventeenth century to Colbert of a famine in which "no adequate idea" could be given "of the sufferings of the people."\*

But this is only a part of the story. After all, the causes and character of the present problem can be revealed only by a correct appreciation of the facts of Indian history. It is indeed unnecessary on this occasion to detail many of them. But some of these facts and conditions must be briefly recalled. Here, then, is the British Empire in India and Burma, a region lacking in geographic unity, as large as that portion of the United States east of a line drawn from Bismarck in the north to El Paso in the South. Here is a population numbering nearly four times that of the United

\* Cf. Hopkins: *India, Old and New*.

States in 1901, of great diversity in race, religion, language, civilization and history. These people are not ruled in accordance with a uniform system, for there are more governments in India than there are religions. And even within some of the larger groups of the population separations of belief, occupation and interest secure an even greater diversity of ideals. To these differences of every description, religion and social custom naturally give special sanction and sanctity among people to whom religion is still a powerful matter of every day life. Here, too, the subtlest intellectual ability is to be found side by side with the deepest veneration for mere tradition and with unexpected credulity as to the new and the unknown.

For the first time in their history these lands and populations are under one supreme authority. Indeed rarely in modern times and for any long period has any of the larger portions of this empire had real political unity. The tradition is that of separation, of the disintegration of successive political fabrics, which the military ardor and administrative ability of various individuals and families may have set up for longer or shorter periods of time. Rebellion and secession have been habits of Indian politics. In like fashion large portions of the present Indian Empire have been the prize of successive foreign conquerors. Until recently wars and raids have for nearly 1200 years been the almost yearly occupation of many of its rulers. Apparently never before in historic times has so large a portion of India been at peace as within the last fifty years. For the second Afghan war, the third Burmese war, and the frontier expeditions have left the great centers of the empire undisturbed. Yet to-day the traditions of Indian history are still strong; the forces of unrest, of rebellion, of disintegration are threatening the political system as they have so regularly done in times past. From this point of view, therefore, the fact that there is an Indian problem to-day is in line with the history of India. But this does not lessen the difficulty of that problem.

So far we have considered Indian history in the singular. In reality it is made up of the histories of many ancient governments and peoples. A number of these are part of

the British Empire, enjoying a large degree of autonomy, proud of their relative freedom from administrative control by the foreigner and hostile to the pretensions of outside forces whether Asiatic or European. Nowhere in the literature on this general subject can be seen any solution of this question which would be at all likely to satisfy the aims and aspirations of the native states now included in the Indian Empire. Of course complete independence, the division of India into a multitude of petty sovereignties and a few larger states would be the answer to this query by certain sections of public opinion. Such a result, however, even if the peaceable withdrawal of the British were conceded, would inaugurate a long period of wars between these states, the conquest of the smaller and weaker states by the larger and stronger. Such a condition would invite foreign intervention in the interests of peace if not of selfish aggrandizement. Here, then, is another difficulty closely related to the ancient yet continuing political tendencies of India.

In the third place is religion. The two militant religious systems of India, Hinduism and Islam, have a long record both of hostility and of mutual toleration. Their relations are of the greatest importance; indeed the cycles of religious history are everywhere important in politics. The practical expulsion of Buddhism from India proper, the great Hindu revival which compelled it, and the establishment of Muhammadanism as the religion of a fighting and conquering class, together with the subsequent quieter extension of Islam among the lower ranks of Hindu society are all factors in Indian political and social development. The seventeenth century, however, marked high tide of Muhammadan influence in India as in other parts of Africa and in Europe. Indeed there is an interesting parallel in the fashions in which by the end of the seventeenth century Protestantism and Muhammadanism had each reached its maximum of territorial extension in Europe and in Asia respectively. Since that time the expansion of Protestantism has chiefly been in North America, Australia and South Africa, that of Roman Catholicism in South America and that of Islam in Western and Central Africa. Subsequently in India,

on the other hand, Hinduism, of one sort or another, took on new fervor and political force in the rise of the Marathas and the Sikhs. But this attempt to recover political leadership in India by Hindu confederacies and states was stopped by the rise of British rule and by force of British arms. Thus, although the first charters of British administration were gained from decadent Muhammadan officials, the real acquisition of India was largely at the expense of nascent Hindu princes. Under these circumstances, because there were far more Hindus than Muhammadans and because, certainly since the Mutiny, the Muhammadans have until recently to a great extent withdrawn themselves in proud disappointment from political activity in India the British have recognized Hindu rather than Muhammadan assistance in the administration of India. The result was that even in Eastern Bengal, where the Muhammadans were in a decided majority, the civil staff, in so far as it was opened to natives at all, has until recently been largely recruited from the minority—from Hindu society. The Hindu of Calcutta, of Madras and of Bombay has furthermore shown remarkable activity in availing himself of the opportunities for education, such as it is; he has been aided in this by a remarkable memory, by great intellectual dexterity, especially in the field of the humanities. For science he apparently has less appreciation or capacity.

But side by side with this eager desire to acquire one sort of European education there has also been a revival of ancient Hindu feeling and a renascence of political as well as religious ambition. Under the stimulus of this provocative situation and also because of other enlivening forces, outside of India, Muhammadan society in India has also been stirred. Indeed throughout the East and in Africa Pan-Islamism has become a political factor. In India, however, other and more local ambitions, have been affected by this general situation. The Muhammadans of India, therefore, are asking for greater recognition by the British, while protesting their loyalty to British rule. The alignment of Hindu and Muhammadan, while in the ear of each a quicker step is beating, is not a sign of peace nor a promise of mutual



toleration. Politics and religion are the two sides of the single coin which passes current throughout India and indeed throughout Asia. And, while such primal social forces are stirring with renewed vitality, the readjustment of relations between Hindu and Muhammadan and between both and the English is pregnant with the gravest difficulties. So the stimulating memories of social antagonisms, the zest of religious propaganda, and the smoldering jealousies of fanaticism are the complicating possibilities of revived political ambitions on the part of both Hindu and Muhammadan in India.

But there is a fourth aspect of this matter. The development of India has been largely influenced in earlier periods by the history of other parts of Asia; and many of the dominant political forces in India have been of foreign origin; nevertheless the history of the past century has, on the whole, set India apart, in comparative isolation from the rest of Asia. The course of events in the Far East or in the Near East has not until recently directly stimulated the inner life of India. This condition, however, has passed, perhaps forever. Certainly now and in the immediate future the problem of India belongs to the larger problem of Asia. In Turkey, Persia, China, Korea and the Philippines, as well as in India, are similar energetic political and social forces working toward the solution of local problems, yet at the same time as part of a larger movement. The student must, therefore, appreciate the connection of the present problem of India with the Asiatic question as a whole and mark at least the influence of contemporary Asia on India.

Two things, however, are important. We in America have a breathless benevolence for the future and often find it hard to realize the hold of deep rootages in ancient custom and local habit. The undoubted awakening of Asia has led some to assume that in various Asiatic countries whole peoples could wheel in orderly fashion from the ancient highway to a new avenue, where the country was rough and the road makers were not skillful. The heirlooms, moreover, are in the baggage; and a revolution, a constitution, and all the glib patter of the professional agita-



tor and the hasty patriot are of small account compared with the ancient history which even a new nation may not forget.

But, on the other hand, open to all the tempests stands the new age—

“half built against the sky.”  
“Scaffolding veils the wall,  
And dim dust floats and falls,  
As, moving to and fro, their tasks the masons ply.”

And the masons are, for a wonder, hurrying in Asia. Busts of Rousseau on sale in China; Thos. Cook & Sons planning an excursion ticket *via* railway and steamboat for the pilgrimage to Mecca; the American school-teacher in the Philippines; and the dash of the Japanese torpedo boats in the harbor at Port Arthur. This world is a “catholic kind of place,” but such facts Asia has never seen “save out of one chimerical generation.” So must the soothsayers give way—the prophets of it never can be because it never was.

And now the isolation of India has passed. The spectacular successes of Japan, for example, attracted the most sympathetic and jubilant notice in the native press of India. How far these successes were a cause of the present revival of native feeling in India is open to debate; but, even if the causal connection is not as strong and direct as has been assumed by some observers, the fact still remains that an immense interest in Japanese policies has been aroused in certain influential sections of Indian society.

On the one hand, the awakening of an increased sense of Asiatic unity among the peoples of the Far East and Malaya and Burma by the Buddhist revival has on the whole had only an academic interest for India. And this is probably an advantage, for it has prevented any entanglement of religious jealousy, from interfering with the development of an appreciation of other currents of Asiatic feeling in China and Japan. The military, economic and political achievements of Japan, however, and agitating educational and social reforms in China, have been of special significance to Indian thought on these matters. Thus the ancient policy

of the Chinese boycott and its recent application have had at least a counterpart in Bengal in the "Swadeshi" movement. "Swadeshi" has recently been applied in rough and unfortunate fashion to economic conditions, in an attempt to boycott goods of European origin; but true "Swadeshi" is essentially a much broader movement, hiding the continuing spirit and some of the characteristics of Indian thought and life, "the patient, deep disdain" of Asia for Europe.

Of course the other side of this movement is the notion of a general strike, the adoption of some of the conceptions and methods of European anarchists by some of the extremists in India. But still another sign of the relation of the Indian situation to Asiatic affairs is the feeling in certain quarters in Calcutta that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is really a betrayal of Asiatic interests by Japan. There are not a few Indians who look eagerly for the ending of that compact as the signal for the reduction of British power in India. Yet Indian students are now going to Japan as Chinese students did a few years ago; and at the other end of Asia it was an Indian who last winter largely assisted in the organization of the student revolt in the Syrian Protestant College at Beirut.

The influence on India of recent events in Persia and more particularly in Turkey and Arabia is hard to measure. It is too early to know whether the Wahabbi unrest in Arabia, which has been reaching perilously close to the holy cities, will have any serious effect on Muhammadan opinion in India. In time past, however, similar movements have had a decided rôle in promoting disturbance. The more important question is whether the attempts to establish representative institutions in both *Shiah* and *Sunni* countries, in Persia and in Turkey, may not be responsible for an even greater awakening of political hopes in India. The fashion in which until very recently Indian Muhammadans of both branches have held aloof from political agitation is no evidence that this self-denial will continue. Indeed the signs of change can already be seen. As the Turkish revolution has complicated the English position in Egypt, so it may well have an increasing influence in India on Hindu as well as on

Muhammadan, though not necessarily to bring these two into greater agreement and coöperation.

From another point of view also the isolation of India has passed. For as the German railway to Baghdad comes to completion, as Russian influence in northern Persia increases, the monopoly of English influence in India threatens to decrease. It may then be possible for the native of India to find over his shoulder a European interest which might give secret if not open support to his policy of baiting the British. An increase in the solidarity of Asiatic feeling, therefore, is now a probability of the future; and the extension of European rivalries to almost every part of Asia makes the agitation in India a matter of general Asiatic significance. It may at the opportune time give special occasion for foreign influence on the Indian problem. Thus this problem becomes a matter of world politics. Its difficulty is thereby only increased.

But as yet we have not touched the question which many would consider foremost. The difficulties arising from the direct relations of England and India constitute in themselves a field for endless discussion and speculation. These relations are naturally within the special range of native agitation in India and provide the stormiest subjects for question and debate in Parliament. It is the unfortunate experience of politics that complicated questions are rarely studied till they become urgent of solution. When calm honesty is most needed partisan vociferation deafens the jury. In this respect the Indian problem shares the common lot of live questions.

There is on the one hand a grieved and now insulted public opinion in England and among Anglo-Indians in India. This opinion is reluctantly realizing that a considerable portion of the population of India hates English rule. Hitherto many of these honest men have, for the most part, lived content, possibly in the hope that an arduous and unselfish life must in the end be appreciated even by the silent if not "sullen peoples." They have unconsciously followed Oliver Cromwell and thought as he spoke of government "for the good of the people and for their interest, and with-

out respect had to any other interest," thinking, as he did, "that's the question; what's for their good, not what pleases them." Indeed there is scarcely a worthy book written in the period 1850-1880 which does not voice this conviction. Since 1880 the chorus of a natural self-satisfaction has scarcely lessened. The British public at home, serene in the benevolence of its intentions and apparent success, has till recently rested secure as Archbishop Laud did. The intentions of Charles I were good; his policies must therefore be wise. And a wonderful achievement along certain and important lines in India has been won, at what cost the world may never know; certainly the glib orator of the Indian National Congress hardly appreciates. It is not necessary to copy any of the almost grandiloquent descriptions of British administrative success in India, as you may find them with slight variation in book after book. Indeed we cannot contemplate the possibilities of Indian history during the last century if English rule in India had been lacking. This may be due to prejudice, yet I hope it is not. At all events we must recognize that all is now not for the best in this best of possible worlds. *Candide* and the professional optimist have had their day.

Soon the other hand rises a chorus *crescendo accelerando*. A section of Indian society, now articulate, thanks in large degree to English education, voices both present wrongs and ancient disappointments. Even in America, we have already heard in most eloquent language the views of this element. I use the word advisedly, although it will well arouse discontent in the minds of those who may believe that they have heard the voice of India and of no mere element. They have not. But if they have heard what at the outside estimate some ten per cent of the population of India really knows it thinks of British government they have also heard what nearly thirty million people think. Consider that day and night with increasing ardor such statements as some heard from Swami Abhedananda and his friends are being dinned into the ears of a still vaster population, and believe that the possibilities of future and further discontent with British rule are almost beyond calculation.

We can then realize that there is a great difference of opinion as to British rule in India between the Anglo-Indian official and the British public on the one hand and a constantly increasing section of Indian society on the other. On the whole the blindness of one party and the inaccurate assumptions of the other seem to me to belong to the usual order of partizan characteristics. It is probably inevitable that injustice should be done to each party by the other. There are undoubted errors in British rule to-day as there is also a firm belief that, in spite of all its mistakes, British rule is better for India than the sort of native rule which the natives could set up for themselves. There is the natural confidence of men untrained to politics that native rule of any sort must be better for India than the best rule that the foreigner can give. So you have as the fifth real difficulty in the problem of India this dead-lock of opinion. That it is of the gravest sort you can appreciate as you read of assassination in England and bomb throwing in India. But what are some of the questions involved in this dead-lock and how far do these questions themselves present difficulties?

First of all is the educational system which English direction and native development have set up in India. Here this matter must be touched only with a view to the special problems treated in this paper. The extraordinary contrasts of Indian history are, however, perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in its recent educational history. There is certainly grim irony in the situation. Here we have a tribe of busy sportsmen, the "goddams" as the French Canadians used to call them, settling the educational policies of a race, whose complete systems of philosophy are almost contemporary with the early Celtic invasions of Britain. To the many castes of India another was added, the caste of the foreign ruler, who ate beef and scorned what he could not understand. Blind himself to the signs of the times his rationalistic liberalism led him, at first grudgingly and slowly, to assist in spreading a thin veneer of so-called Western culture on a surface already deeply scarred by the lessons of the ages. To-day in England we may hope for some serious consideration of educational methods and of

the value of purely literary and philosophical studies as compared with the more practical tests of the physical and social sciences. But when Macaulay laid his unfortunate burden on the Indian student the Englishman in all sincerity believed a solemn duty had been successfully assumed. Superficial and almost useless learning by rote, mere tests of memory, a false yet exalted worship of the examination system have been in large part the result. The careful rating on the basis of marks in examinations and the use of the examination as the only real passage to the haven of government service have degraded lofty literary and philosophical subjects, and even the little science that has crept in, to the basis of crude commercialism. Little is valued except for the sake of the examination mark. So a boy's standing in the schools gained by foolish cramming with the aid of parrot-like memory and digested *syllabi* may fix the amount of dowry which his father may demand with the future bride for this precocious product of mistaken pedagogy. Intellectually and morally the Indian peoples, and in particular the Hindu of Bengal, have as a whole profited little by English education. Of course the great mass of the population have remained in their illiteracy undisturbed by this process. But the result is that the natural leaders of an embryo nation have been badly trained for their future work, have on the one hand lost touch with their own people and also failed to get the best and most useful of what Europe could have given them. Of course I speak in most general terms. The relatively few individual cases where better results have been obtained cannot, however, be taken as typical. Indeed one of the most significant and discouraging signs of the times is the hostility and frantic opposition of Hindu educational leaders to the attempts of Lord Curzon to make the system more effective and to secure better methods of education. The effect of this situation on present politics is great. If Englishmen are chagrined at the failure of the natives of India to rise to new responsibilities, if they are alarmed at the garrulous misrepresentation of vengeful office-seekers they have themselves to blame to a considerable degree.



A second live difficulty is the dead-lock over the economic question. The unfriendly critics of British rule usually make a great deal of the exploitation of India, and especially of Bengal, in the consulships of Clive and Warren Hastings. They often involve both of these remarkable men in the general corruption of the period. Then with long reach and cumulative arithmetic they calculate the present poverty of India back to the days of an unreformed House of Commons and a rapacious East India Company. Even if all were true I cannot see that the economic drain of India by English commercial freebooters at the close of the eighteenth century has very much to do with the present situation. Furthermore, we have here in any event a bad case of political indigestion caused in large parts by that brilliant work, of "near-fiction," Macaulay's essay on Warren Hastings. It is, however, a deep reproach to modern, and particularly to English, scholarship that more thorough work has not been done on the financial relations of England and India. It has been left very largely to Mr. Romesh Dutt, to deal with the modern economic history of India. His works are a veritable storehouse of statements and deductions laid forth in scholastic form. From his pages nearly every Indian patriot cites liberally with more or less accuracy. A less scholarly work by the late Mr. Digby bears the ironical title "Prosperous British India." It is on the whole less convincing if more stimulating than Mr. Dutt's books. The death of Mr. Justice Ranadé was a misfortune to real students of the economic question, for the first word has really only been mumbled. On the whole, the impartial investigator must continue to feel that, however serious the charges of economic exploitation and maladministration by the English may appear to be in the pages of Dutt and Digby, the data for the earlier period, particularly from 1815 to 1858, are dubious and that in some cases a wonderful trust has been shown in the work of early discredited compilers, such as Montgomery Martin who wrote about 1840. I do not know what the truth is regarding the history of Anglo-Indian economics. But the whole subject is now in that uncertain condition most inviting to present day political debate. The result of that debate is heat, not light.

The contemporary economic situation is scarcely less productive of differences in opinion. The army of figures, yearly marshaled in the official records, would at first thought encourage the hope that the truth might be here secured. One of the characteristic features of the whole matter, however, is the hopeless inaccuracy of partisan pamphleteers. The native Indian press is doing incalculable harm to the cherished cause of Indian nationalism by methods which threaten to discredit even statements which may very well be true. On the other hand the general indifference of the English public to the situation is extraordinary. Only recently has there been much effective appreciation of real mistakes of English economic policy. I am not so much concerned with the question of the economic drain from India to England, whether it be annually £18,000,000 or £25,000,000 or at the most £30,000,000. Even if these figures are not susceptible to certain modification this drain may be regarded by some as at least in part a sort of insurance, paid unwillingly to be sure, but guaranteeing to India certain benefits. The difficult question of land tax, the lack of sufficient irrigation projects, the extravagance of government celebrations such as the recent Durbar, the state of Indian industries, the bureaucratic rust eating into administration—these are only a few of the fields in which it seems to me galling charges can be brought against British economic policy in India. At all events the net result both in real life and in political propaganda is alarming, if not disheartening.

Still a third feature in this dead-lock of opinion is the increasing friction caused by racial contact, and the changed conditions of intercourse between England and India which have affected the character and methods of British rule in India. For one thing, more Englishmen go to India than ever before; and more Indians go to England. There is an advantage in this, but there may be serious and unwelcome results as well. The Indian goes to England to study the anatomy of English life and power; he sometimes mistakes the skeleton in the closet for the proper subject of study. On the other hand the purely commercial Englishman, even

when not of the "beach-comber" type often lacks a sense of responsibility; and insular ignorance may lead to impertinence and insult to the respectable native. In both cases sympathetic racial relations suffer.

The telegraph, daily news and orders from the other side of the world, and the attempt to satisfy a double standard of public opinion have also affected the position and responsibilities of rulers in India who are no longer lonely. This condition has made Lord Morley, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, one of the most influential and autocratic rulers that India has known in recent years. The relatively few Indians who really know much about what is going on in England have also learned the possibility of appeal to Cæsar. They have their spokesmen, however few and ineffective, in Parliament; and they have learned that Cæsar has many heads. The administration of the expert, therefore, the judgment of the man on the spot, is now entangled by remote and foreign forces. Government by "wireless" is a new thing; not necessarily a wise thing.

The general tendencies of racial feeling in other parts of the world have also had an influence in India. For obscure and varied reasons the contact of races is producing greater friction to-day. On both sides there may be more vigorous self-assertion; there certainly is greater jealousy and impatience on the part of the white man. His task of keeping himself clear from the spiritual penalties of power is too difficult. Ruling other people is hard on the character of the ruler. So there has been bred in India an increasing habit of hostility on the part of some leaders; and at any time this may be translated into dire action as the lower ranks on both sides imitate with less comprehension the often unconscious yet arrogant attitude of their superior. So, on the whole, opinion is enflamed.

By selection three energetic causes of debate as to Anglo-Indian relations have been briefly suggested to you. I come now to a sixth major difficulty of the Indian problem,—the influence of this problem on the affairs of the British Empire and the effect of recent British imperial policies and problems on Indian politics. And here again I must rigorously confine myself to a few aspects of a large matter.

Europe was surprised when in 1801 a British force was successfully sent from India to expel the French from Egypt. Here was the first exhibition of the resiliency of the Anglo-Indian Empire. The order to send 7000 Indian troops to Malta in 1878 and the coöperation of Indian troops in various recent British expeditionary forces in China as well as in Egypt has further illustrated this factor. But the efficiency, if not the loyalty, of the native troops under British command and also of the armies of the Indian native states have serious limitations. While we had no hesitancy in using negro troops against the Spanish and in the Philippines, it is doubtful whether British public opinion would encourage the use of native Indian regiments, though officered by white men, in any war outside of Asia against a European or American enemy. Certainly during the South African war, when the temptation must have been severe, the notion that it was a "*Sahib's* war," a fight of white man against white man, in which no Asiatic need apply, proved sufficient to prevent the use of Indian troops. It is an interesting speculation whether any such self-denying ordinance would hold, if unfortunately in years to come hostilities should break out between England and Japan, or between England and the United States, when our negro troops might be used in the Philippines. At all events one phase of racial feeling as well is hereby indicated.

But if the existence of the Indian armies has been of some limited use to the British Empire at large, the increasing necessity of maintaining a large British force in India suggests still another aspect of the matter. For the time we can disregard the agitating question of the financial cost of this army. It is there "to sit on the lid." The events of the last few months are not likely to decrease its size and those events may tend increasingly to justify to the British tax-payer his content that the costs are charged to the Indian budget. The fact is, however, that the Indian situation to-day actually decreases and will continue to decrease the military efficiency of the British Empire. I say this with due appreciation that India affords an excellent training ground for the British army and that heroic efforts have been made by

Lord Kitchener to squeeze out of the government of India the necessary funds and power to promote the cause of military reform. Whether Lord Kitchener's ideas and whether the larger issue of militarism, which his attitude has provoked are for the best interests even of the British Empire, is another matter. At all events the fact remains that at the other end of the Suez canal an army is detained whose hasty intrenchment on the east coast of Britain might turn the scale in some Armageddon of the future.

Turning, however, from purely military matters, English colonial policies and crises have special significance in view of the Indian situation. The retired Anglo-Indian official has had no doubt that the burdens of British South African policy in 1879-1880 and more particularly in 1898-1901 have told heavily on British interests in India. In the earlier period the policy finally adopted with regard to Afghanistan was probably influenced by the situation in South Africa. And in the recent struggle the drain on the empire was undoubtedly immense. Furthermore, the revelation of mismanagement was a delightful surprise told not even in whispers in Calcutta bazaar and later rumored across the border. The resulting prolonged public discussion in England of the deficiencies of British colonial and military policies has naturally furnished food for discussion to the gentlemen at Puna and even at Lahore. A recent English visitor to the maneuvers near Peshawar of the crack corps of the Anglo-Indian army reports the bland inquiry and comment of a native: "Your army in England is no good now?" What jubilation the recent naval panic has produced in the minds of native schemes at Bombay I do not know. Again the great longing of many agitators in India, even of the more moderate type, is to be able to "answer back" effectively to any unwelcome policy dictated from Whitehall. The successful assertion by Natal in 1906 of local colonial opinion as to the trial of natives connected in the uprising there lighted a vista to the advocates of Indian autonomy. The further problem of the protection of native Indian subjects in other portions of the British Empire has illustrated another aspect of the indirect relations of Canada and South Africa to India.

But a more important phase would at once be exposed by any real attempt to deal with the economic question. It is almost impossible to see how the trade interests of India and of other portions of the British Empire can be successfully covered by the same roof, however striped and gabled. Any plan of an imperial customs union must be considered in the light of the Indian situation. However, I congratulate myself that this subject cannot be taken up in this paper. The connection of the Indian problem with British imperialism is therefore close, yet perplexing. The colonies set an example to Indian ambition; and British colonial policy creates situations which hamper the development of a policy clearly wise for India.

Lastly is the difficulty arising from the present state of English politics and public opinion. The situation at home is particularly complicated by the almost universal range of British interests. Thus foreign as well as domestic factors must be kept as *arrière-pensées*. The history of the last thirty years in England, when finally the proper and possible time arrives in which to write of it intelligently and with real knowledge, will, I think, be notable for at least two things. On the one hand there is treatment by successive British ministries of three foreign problems of the first order; and in the second place, there is the rise of two relatively new factors in English domestic politics and public opinion.

Among other matters Lord Beaconsfield bequeathed to the Liberal ministry of 1880 three major problems, unsolved and bristling with difficulties, viz.: the assertion of a dominant British interest in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal where imperial connections were involved; secondly, the natural hostility of Russia, balked in her plans by the British policy which had led to the Congress of Berlin; and thirdly, and more clearly of special importance in Indian matters, the Afghan war and the whole potential situation in the Middle East, a region where Russian hostility might well work special damage to British interests.

Now at the end of thirty years we can see after vacillations and a welter of blood the establishment and maintenance of British administrative control in Egypt and the pro-



tection of the Suez canal, while the battle of Omdurman has checked the probability of Franco-Russian intrigue in the upper Sudan and Abyssinia respectively. Anglo-Russian rivalry has undergone at least an eclipse. A wiser appreciation both of the need of Russian influence in European politics and of the value of accomodation in fields of mutual interest in Asia has, for the time being, relieved England. And this at a time when she apparently needed both hands free to deal with a possible Anglo-German crisis. All this has in the third place, reacted on the situation in Central Asia. The wisdom of British withdrawal from Afghanistan is clearer to-day than in the eighties. But the politic assertions of the continuance of British interests in that region and the Tibetan expedition place England to-day in a much stronger position in this region than ever before. However, the reaction of these three results on the Indian problem may perhaps be better realized if we imagine for a moment what would be the possibilities if, instead of the actual situation, we saw, in the Levant, the route to India unguarded and the forces both of European hostility and Muhammadan unrest threatening that route. As far as Russia is concerned the continuing crisis in Persia, coming fast on the heels of Turkish revolutions and disturbances in India, would be the occasion of far greater alarm and international friction. A similar condition of uncertainty and a wider range of obligation and possibility in Central Asia would only intensify the critical character of present politics.

We have been considering what might have been. That the situation is different is no real guarantee that the prospects of the future may be fair. These fields of foreign politics each contain the possibilities, if not the probabilities, of future discord. Thus it is a matter of doubt to me how long the British public will remain reasonably quiescent as to Russian advance in Persia. A more rapid increase in Russian influence, a quicker step toward the Persian Gulf, and the politics of the future would at once be pregnant with war. And it is just these possibilities on which the radical Indian nationalists most depend for the weakening of British

policies in India, and finally for the realization of dreams of independence. It is hard to think of India as a whole; it is harder still to measure the relation of Indian politics to international policies of world-wide range. Yet we will miss something if we do not think on these things.

The changes and problems of more clearly domestic character have, however, another sort of significance for Indian affairs. Two relatively new tendencies in English domestic politics and public opinion must now be mentioned. On the one hand is the increasing influence of the economic problem at home, the entry of the Labor party into more or less effective participation in national politics, and the consequent tendency of the government to consider imperial questions with reference to the discontent of a hitherto submerged democracy at home. On the other hand is an increased hardness of the ruling classes. The older passions of liberalism, the glow of sympathy with struggling nationalities are chilled. The men who cheered Kossuth and rallied to Garibaldi are dead. The experience of decreased economic prosperity, the stress of foreign competition, the bitter and surprising realization that after all, Englishmen are misunderstood, if not actually unpopular, almost the world over, each factor has had its influence on national character. A people in a panic is not likely to be either wise or merciful; the national nerves have undergone a great strain; and obstinacy is not lacking in the British constitution. The new element in political life at home is, therefore, untrained to deal with Indian affairs; and the older element is bewildered and naturally incensed by the disappearance of many of the flattering monuments to British prestige. So the domestic situation, from whichever aspect we may view it, is perplexing. And after all, sovereignty in India is domestic in England.

As you may now imagine, the Indian problem as a whole does not admit to my mind of any satisfactory answer at present. The conciliatory policy of Lord Morley and the association of an increased but limited number of natives in the Indian councils does not seem likely to appease the extremists in India or in England. It may allay agitation

temporarily, but, though probably a wise step, it may be misunderstood by self-constituted political leaders in India as a sign of weakening on the part of the British government. Nothing could be more unfortunate. For on the whole while the government of India by the British may be reformed, it is not going to disappear in our day or for a very long time to come. The sooner Indians realize this the better. And yet do not mistake me. I regard the attitude and hopes of the moderate section of Indian patriots as most natural. Some of these men may be unwise; they may not appreciate all the difficulties and dangers which their desires involve; but it is no discredit to them personally that they have taken the air of a new age and look with longing to the hills, where men stand erect, secure, with muscles hardened by the patient ascent towards freedom. The chief present danger to Indian nationalism is the discrediting, if not the utter ruin of its cause by political demagogues, reckless in thought, vengeful in action, preaching liberty but eager for power, largely to satisfy personal ambition as long ago, the prophet Jeremiah spoke: Ye have not hearkened unto me, in proclaiming liberty, every one to his mother, and every man to his neighbor: behold I proclaim a liberty for you, with the Lord, to the sword and to the pestilence. On the shoulders of real native leaders therefore, rests a tremendous responsibility. They must see to it that they do not lead the people of India astray, hurrying them towards a false dawn.

Resolutely, however, I have declined in this paper to advocate solutions of problems, which have been merely labeled. The connections and combinations of various facts and policies, the attempt to analyze a complicated situation are surely enough; and, if bewildering, at least we have for our comfort the knowledge that much more has been left out than has been included.

We can still follow the wonderful, if bloodstained, pageant of Indian history. The racking realities of poverty and famine, the perplexing tangle of old hopes and new fears, the interests of the desert and of the thronging bazaar, the "tawdry rule of kings," and the ancient service of the Golden Rule are all parts of this great matter.